Gizachew Asrat Woldemariam, Ph.D. Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Email: gizachew.a.woldemariam@ifa.gov.et
Abstract
This paper assesses the Ethiopia–Eritrea relationship through the theoretical lens of the security and foreign policy of landlocked States. It argues that Ethiopia’s landlockedness and Eritrea’s coastal leverage have produced a structural asymmetry that perpetuates cycles of mistrust, strategic misperception, and fragile cooperation. By integrating historical and political analysis with the landlocked-state framework, the study reveals that Ethiopia’s economic and security imperatives are inherently linked to Eritrea’s geopolitical position. Comparative insights from Afghanistan, Botswana, Armenia, and Switzerland demonstrate that durable peace depends on institutionalized interdependence and multilateral guarantees for transit and access. The paper concludes that Ethiopia and Eritrea can transform their zero-sum rivalry into a win–win partnership through joint corridor diplomacy and cooperative sovereignty mechanisms anchored in international law and regional integration frameworks.
Keywords: Ethiopia, Eritrea, landlocked geopolitics, peacebuilding, regional integration, foreign policy
Introduction
The Horn of Africa remains one of the most complex and strategically contested regions in the world, shaped by overlapping historical grievances, ethno-political fragmentation, and regional rivalries. Within this volatile environment, the Ethiopia–Eritrea relationship occupies a pivotal role in determining regional peace and stability. The political transition in Ethiopia in 2018 created unprecedented opportunities for regional stability and renewed dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s diplomatic outreach quickly engaged Eritrean leadership and signaled a departure from the entrenched hostility that had dominated bilateral relations for decades. For President Isaias Afwerki, the change in Ethiopia represented the decline of TPLF influence and the emergence of a new leadership in Addis Ababa that Eritrea could trust. This political shift was perceived as a validation of Eritrea’s long-standing position that the TPLF had dominated Ethiopian politics to its detriment, and it opened the door for constructive engagement (Bereketeab, 2019).
Eritrea, which shares a 1,030-kilometer border with Ethiopia, had gained independence in 1993 after decades of struggle against Ethiopian rule. Between 1998 and 2000, the two countries fought a brutal border war that left tens of thousands dead and many more displaced. Following the cessation of hostilities, relations were defined by a “no war, no peace” status quo, characterized by deep mistrust and minimal cooperation.
The 2018 rapprochement marked a historic change in this dynamic. Ethiopia, focused on consolidating domestic political transitions and preventing further unrest, offered an opportunity for Eritrea to emerge from relative isolation. The strategic importance of Eritrea’s Red Sea ports, particularly during regional conflicts such as the war in Yemen, further enhanced the incentive for engagement (Vertin, 2019). Symbolic gestures during this period reinforced Ethiopia’s recognition of Eritrean sovereignty. President Afwerki’s visits to Addis Ababa and other Ethiopian regions, including Sidama (Hawasa city) and Amhara (Bahir Dare city), along with the presentation of a camel and commemoration of Nakfa, underscored the acknowledgment of Eritrea’s independence and territorial integrity. Ethiopia’s acceptance of the 2002 boundary decision by an independent commission further strengthened optimism for the resolution of a historically intractable border dispute (Stigant & Phelan, 2019; Keane, 2018). The Jeddah Agreement formalized the cessation of hostilities, establishing a framework for cooperation in trade, security, investment, and cultural exchange, and granting Ethiopia access to the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa (Otieno, 2018).
However, sustaining this peace required effective institutionalization, which proved challenging given the structural and administrative asymmetries between the two states. Ethiopia’s well-established bureaucratic structures contrasted sharply with Eritrea’s highly centralized governance, in which decision-making remained largely at the discretion of President Afwerki. These structural differences posed significant hurdles in translating agreements into practical, long-term cooperation. This article analysis is guided by two central research questions and it adopts Mahdi’s (2021) Security and Foreign Policy of Landlocked States framework to interpret Ethiopia–Eritrea dynamics not merely as a bilateral political issue but as a manifestation of the broader strategic dilemmas of landlocked states.
- What historical, political, and structural factors have shaped the Ethiopia–Eritrea relationship from conflict to recent rapprochement? This question directs attention to the interplay of domestic political conditions, leadership decisions, and the legacy of past conflicts in determining the bilateral dynamic.
- What challenges and opportunities exist for institutionalizing sustainable peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the current geopolitical context of the Horn of Africa?
Theoretical Framework: Security and Foreign Policy of Landlocked States
Mahdi’s (2021) framework on the security and foreign policy of landlocked States provides an analytical foundation for understanding Ethiopia’s foreign policy dilemmas after losing its coastline. The theory posits that landlocked states are characterized by three structural conditions: (1) geographical vulnerability due to dependence on transit neighbors; (2) strategic adaptation through multi-vector diplomacy and economic diversification; and (3) the pursuit of regional interdependence as a pathway to mitigate insecurity. Case studies such as Switzerland, Botswana, Armenia, and Afghanistan illustrate diverse strategies in balancing these constraints. Switzerland’s neutrality and strong institutions enabled it to transcend geographical limitations, whereas Botswana leveraged high-value, low-volume exports to avoid overdependence on transit routes. In contrast, Afghanistan and Armenia demonstrate how domestic instability and nationalist narratives can exacerbate vulnerability and isolation.
Historical Roots of the Ethiopia–Eritrea Conflict
Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia in 1993 ended decades of armed struggle but created a new geopolitical reality for Addis Ababa. The 1998–2000 border war, rooted in disputes over sovereignty and identity, left deep scars and entrenched a ‘no war, no peace’ status quo for nearly two decades. Domestically, diversionary politics in both states fueled escalation: Ethiopia’s fragile ethnic federal system under the TPLF-dominated EPRDF created legitimacy deficits, while Eritrea’s leadership used the conflict to consolidate power (Butcher & Maru, 2018). Structurally, Ethiopia’s sudden loss of coastline transformed maritime access into a securitized national concern which left the country to structural vulnerability.
The Ethiopia–Eritrea border war is one of the deadliest inter-state conflicts in modern African history. Its escalation can be traced to structural opportunities and constraints arising from partial democratization in both countries following the overthrow of the Derg regime. In Ethiopia, domestic political instability, weak legitimacy of the TPLF-led EPRDF, and ethnic federalism created vulnerabilities that Eritrea could exploit. This political environment provided incentives for Eritrea to pursue territorial claims and assert regional influence (Butcher & Maru, 2018).
Eritrea maintained a highly disciplined military force, bolstered by continuous compulsory conscription, enabling rapid mobilization in the event of conflict. President Afwerki and his leadership perceived the Ethiopian government as weak, particularly regarding its capacity to defend Tigrayan interests, which created a strategic window for Eritrean assertiveness (Dias, 2011; Bigg, 1998c). Economic pressures, domestic opposition, and the desire to consolidate national identity further motivated Eritrea’s leadership to escalate tensions. Scholars have argued that the outbreak of conflict reflected both leaders’ ambitions and personalities, as well as their calculations regarding domestic political advantages. Afwerki’s vision of Eritrea as a dominant regional actor utilized the border dispute as a pretext for asserting regional influence, while Ethiopia’s internal divisions constrained its capacity to respond effectively (Olika, 2008; Lata, 2006).
The conflict can also be interpreted through the lens of diversionary foreign policy strategies. Eritrea faced internal challenges, including opposition movements such as the Afar Liberation Democratic Movement and socio-economic pressures, which created incentives to project strength externally. Conversely, Ethiopia’s transitional political environment and ethnic federalist tensions limited the government’s flexibility, making escalation of the conflict a politically viable option for both sides (Butcher & Maru, 2018). The war thus reflected not only territorial and security considerations but also the domestic political calculations and leadership ambitions that shaped the policies of both states. This agency based narrative and ambitions is not a closed file when it comes to Eritrea.
Rapprochement and Structural Constraints
The 2018 rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, formalized through the Jeddah Agreement, marked a rare moment of optimism. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s diplomatic outreach and President Isaias Afwerki’s reciprocal engagement ended years of frozen hostility. However, as Mahdi’s framework suggests, peace agreements among asymmetrical neighbors require institutionalization to endure. Eritrea’s centralized governance and Ethiopia’s bureaucratic pluralism created implementation gaps. The absence of joint commissions, transparent follow-up mechanisms, and legal guarantees meant that the symbolic peace lacked structural reinforcement (Aweke & Seid, 2022). The 2018 peace agreement represented a decisive departure from decades of hostility, facilitated by personal diplomacy between the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea. High-profile visits and public gestures of goodwill signaled a readiness to engage in cooperative frameworks. The Jeddah Agreement formalized a comprehensive framework for ending hostilities, strengthening bilateral cooperation across trade, security, investment, and cultural domains, and establishing mechanisms to combat terrorism and illicit trafficking (Otieno, 2018). This accord was widely celebrated as a historic milestone that ended the “no war, no peace” status quo (Stigant & Phelan, 2019; Woldemariam, 2018).
Despite initial optimism, the institutionalization of peace faced significant structural and political challenges. Ethiopia’s administrative systems were well-established, whereas Eritrea’s governance remained highly centralized under President Afwerki. This asymmetry limited the ability of both states to implement agreed-upon measures effectively. Furthermore, the lack of regular ministerial meetings, formal communication channels, and systematic follow-up inhibited the translation of agreements into sustainable outcomes.
The 2018 rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea marked a dramatic departure from decades of hostility, offering hope for lasting peace in the Horn of Africa. However, sustaining this cooperation has proven to be an extraordinarily complex endeavor, shaped by a combination of domestic political dynamics, structural asymmetries, historical grievances, and regional strategic calculations. At the domestic level, Ethiopia’s internal political landscape has exerted a profound influence on its bilateral relations with Eritrea. The 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which sought to resolve the Tigray conflict, notably excluded Eritrean participation, a decision that the Eritrean government interpreted as a threat to its national security and regional standing. The exclusion raised concerns in Asmara about the potential resurgence of Tigrayan forces, particularly the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), whose military capabilities and historical enmity towards Eritrea remain deeply entrenched. From Eritrea’s perspective, the inability to influence outcomes directly in Mekelle, coupled with the interim federal arrangements in Tigray, represented a setback to the strategic objectives that had motivated Eritrean involvement in the conflict from the outset (Council on Foreign Relations; Plaut, 2023). At the same time, Ethiopia’s internal factional disputes—manifested in disagreements over interim leadership appointments and recurrent infighting between political and regional actors—have hampered the effective implementation of peace measures, delaying normalization and feeding mutual suspicion (The New Humanitarian, 2025). The resulting political uncertainty in Ethiopia complicates bilateral planning and creates a perception in Asmara that Addis Ababa may be unable to guarantee the durability of agreements or prevent the reemergence of adversarial actors.
Structural asymmetries between the two states further complicate efforts to sustain cooperation. Ethiopia possesses relatively well-established bureaucratic and institutional systems that allow for formalized policy coordination, while Eritrea operates under a highly centralized governance model dominated by the personal authority of President Isaias Afwerki. This structural divergence limits Eritrea’s capacity to institutionalize foreign policy commitments and challenges Ethiopia’s ability to engage with Asmara through conventional state-to-state mechanisms. As a result, even when agreements are reached at the leadership level, translating these accords into actionable policies requires navigating distinct administrative logics and varying capacities for policy implementation. Moreover, the difference in governance models impacts domestic accountability, transparency, and public buy-in, which are crucial for sustaining long-term cooperation and ensuring that bilateral initiatives endure beyond individual leadership tenures (Bereketeab, 2019; Woldemariam, 2018).
Regional dynamics add an additional layer of complexity. The Horn of Africa remains one of the most geopolitically sensitive regions in the world, where the interests of neighboring states and external powers intersect in ways that can undermine bilateral cooperation. Ethiopia’s efforts to secure port access through agreements with Eritrea and Somaliland have been interpreted by Somalia and other regional actors as provocations, raising tensions and creating opportunities for third-party interference in Ethiopia–Eritrea relations (House of Lords Library, 2025). Simultaneously, Eritrea’s strategic alignments with Egypt and certain Middle Eastern states—including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran—provide it with external support that bolsters Asmara’s bargaining position but can also exacerbate regional competition. The presence of competing regional actors creates overlapping pressure points: Ethiopia seeks to pursue a multipolar foreign policy focused on regional integration and trade diversification, whereas Eritrea continues to pursue a securitized and zero-sum approach to the region, prioritizing national defense and strategic leverage (Vertin, 2019; Plaut, 2023). These divergent strategies not only complicate the implementation of bilateral agreements but also heighten the risk of misperception and unintended escalation, as third-party actors may interpret routine defensive measures as aggressive posturing.
Historical grievances continue to inform current interactions. Eritrea’s memory of past Ethiopian dominance, including the conflicts during the Derg regime and the TPLF era, underpins Asmara’s strategic caution and skepticism toward Addis Ababa’s intentions. The historical perception that Ethiopia’s political transitions often ignore Eritrean security concerns amplifies Eritrea’s reluctance to fully institutionalize cooperative frameworks, while Ethiopia’s concern over Eritrea’s potential interference in its internal affairs fuels mutual mistrust. This historical context is critical in understanding why gestures of goodwill, such as port access agreements and peace declarations, do not automatically translate into stable cooperation; they must be accompanied by sustained, reciprocal commitments that address structural imbalances and historical anxieties (Bereketeab, 2019; Otieno, 2018).
The economic dimension also shapes bilateral cooperation. Ethiopia’s landlocked status makes access to Red Sea ports essential for its trade and national development strategy. The operationalization of access to Assab and Massawa ports, along with logistical cooperation, requires detailed negotiation over customs, security, and revenue-sharing arrangements. Any ambiguity or lack of clarity in these arrangements risks creating friction, as Eritrea can leverage its control of port infrastructure as a bargaining tool. The interplay between economic imperatives and security concerns exemplifies the multi-dimensional nature of the challenges confronting the bilateral relationship (Stigant & Phelan, 2019).
The Political Economy of Landlockedness and Port Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa
Ethiopia’s landlocked status constitutes not only a strategic and security dilemma but also a profound politico–economic constraint that shapes its development trajectory and foreign policy behaviour. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has relied overwhelmingly on the Port of Djibouti, through which over 90 per cent of its external trade transits. While this arrangement has provided relative stability, it has also generated structural vulnerabilities, including elevated logistics costs, exposure to single-corridor disruption, and limited bargaining leverage over transit fees and infrastructure governance (World Bank, 2024; UNCTAD, 2023). These constraints have transformed port access from a technical trade issue into a core national security concern, reinforcing Ethiopia’s incentive to diversify maritime outlets.
Within this context, Eritrea’s ports of Assab and Massawa represent latent economic and strategic assets whose significance extends beyond bilateral relations. From Ethiopia’s perspective, access to Eritrean ports offers the prospect of reduced transit costs, enhanced supply-chain resilience, and strategic redundancy in an increasingly volatile Red Sea environment. For Eritrea, however, port access is not merely an economic opportunity but a source of geopolitical leverage that can be mobilized to offset asymmetries in population size, economic capacity, and regional influence. This asymmetry has historically encouraged a securitized, zero-sum approach to port diplomacy, whereby access is treated as a concession rather than a mutually beneficial economic arrangement.
The failure to operationalize Assab and Massawa following the 2018 rapprochement illustrates the limitations of personalized diplomacy absent institutional frameworks. Effective port cooperation requires detailed agreements on customs administration, revenue-sharing, infrastructure investment, security coordination, and dispute resolution mechanisms. In the absence of such arrangements, Eritrea retains the ability to instrumentalize port access as a bargaining tool, while Ethiopia remains exposed to strategic uncertainty. Comparative experiences from other landlocked states suggest that durable solutions emerge not from ad hoc political goodwill but from legally codified transit regimes embedded in regional and multilateral institutions (Mahdi, 2021; UNCTAD, 2023).
Moreover, Eritrea’s domestic political economy complicates port cooperation. Decades of militarization, limited private-sector development, and the legacy of international sanctions have constrained Asmara’s capacity to modernize port infrastructure and absorb large-scale commercial traffic. While port access could generate revenue and employment, it also carries political risks for the Eritrean leadership, including increased external exposure, demands for regulatory transparency, and pressures for economic liberalization. These internal considerations help explain Eritrea’s cautious and selective engagement with port diplomacy, reinforcing the need for confidence-building mechanisms that align economic incentives with regime security concerns.
From a peacebuilding perspective, reframing port access as a shared development project rather than a zero-sum strategic asset is critical. Joint corridor authorities, co-managed logistics zones, and third-party guarantees potentially involving IGAD, the African Union, or multilateral development banks could help depoliticize transit arrangements and reduce the scope for coercive leverage. Such institutionalized interdependence would not eliminate political tensions, but it could raise the costs of conflict and embed cooperation within durable economic structures.
Misperception, Proxy Politics, and Regional Pressures
Misperception between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains a major source of instability. Eritrea perceives the persistence of TPLF elements as an existential threat, while Ethiopia views Eritrea’s regional militarism as revisionist (Plaut, 2023). Mahdi’s comparative lens on Afghanistan’s insecurity and Armenia’s border politics illuminates this dynamic: when strategic communication collapses, domestic actors exploit ambiguity to justify militarization. Proxy engagements—such as alleged Eritrean support for militias in northern Ethiopia (Reuters, 2023)—further erode trust. Regional rivalries involving Egypt, Sudan, and Gulf states exacerbate this environment, aligning with Mahdi’s finding that landlocked insecurity is magnified in unstable regional systems.
A critical challenge in Ethiopia–Eritrea relations is the persistent divergence in perceptions between the two states and their respective domestic and proxy actors, which creates fertile ground for miscalculations and potential escalation. The intricacy of this issue originates from historical rivalries, conflicting strategic aims, and the complex dynamics of Ethiopia’s internal political environment. Eritrea’s perception of threats is strongly influenced by its historical experience of Ethiopian dominance and the persistent presence of Tigrayan political and military actors, particularly factions of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). From Asmara’s perspective, the TPLF is not merely a domestic Ethiopian political adversary but an existential security threat whose resurgence could jeopardise Eritrea’s sovereignty and strategic interests. This perception has motivated Eritrea to maintain a posture of vigilance and, at times, covert intervention to preempt any perceived threat from northern Ethiopian actors (Plaut, 2023; ICG, 2022).
In contrast, certain TPLF factions and other Ethiopian opposition groups may misinterpret Eritrea’s strategic aversion to overt warfare as tacit support for their military initiatives or proxy actions. This misreading can embolden opposition actors to engage in hostilities that they cannot sustain independently, expecting Eritrean intervention to tip the balance in their favour. Such actions carry the inherent risk of triggering a broader conflict, potentially drawing Eritrea into confrontation, even when its strategic preference is limited engagement or deterrence rather than full-scale war (ICG, 2022). This dynamic highlights the asymmetry between Eritrea’s cautious strategic posture, focused on safeguarding national security, and the more opportunistic calculations of domestic Ethiopian factions, who may act on misperceptions of alliance or support.
The misalignment of expectations is further complicated by Ethiopia’s federal structure and ongoing domestic political fragmentation. The multiplicity of actors, including regional forces such as Fano and the OLF-Shenie, creates a scenario where localised conflicts can escalate beyond their initial scale, particularly if one party interprets Eritrean engagement as legitimising their operations. In such circumstances, the risk of inadvertent escalation becomes significant, as actions undertaken by subnational actors may provoke disproportionate responses at the state level, both from Ethiopia’s federal government and from Eritrea (Plaut, 2023).
Regional dynamics exacerbate these risks. Eritrea’s strategic partnerships with Egypt and certain Gulf states, coupled with Ethiopia’s diplomatic engagements in the Red Sea corridor and Horn of Africa integration initiatives, create overlapping spheres of influence in which misperception can easily take root. For example, Eritrea may interpret Ethiopian moves to diversify port access or deepen regional integration as potential encirclement or economic marginalization, prompting precautionary measures that are misread in Addis Ababa as aggressive posturing. Similarly, external actors may amplify tensions by providing selective intelligence or political signals, further increasing the likelihood of miscalculation.
Historical memory plays a critical role in shaping these perceptions. Both Eritrean and Ethiopian actors operate within narratives constructed over decades of conflict, including the 1998–2000 border war and earlier struggles for national consolidation. These narratives reinforce zero-sum thinking and heighten sensitivity to perceived slights or strategic maneuvers by the other party. Even seemingly minor incidents such as troop movements near disputed boundaries, public rhetoric, or unilateral economic initiatives can trigger a disproportionate reaction if they resonate with historical fears or grievances (Dias, 2011; Steves, 2003).
International Law, Cooperative Sovereignty, and Corridor-Based Peacebuilding
The sustainability of Ethiopia–Eritrea cooperation ultimately depends on anchoring bilateral arrangements within established international and regional legal frameworks. While political declarations and peace accords can signal intent, they lack durability unless translated into legally binding mechanisms that constrain unilateral action and provide predictable rules of engagement (Stigant & Phelan, 2019; UNCTAD, 2023). For landlocked states, international law offers a critical though often underutilized foundation for mitigating structural vulnerability and promoting cooperative sovereignty.
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Part X explicitly recognizes the right of landlocked states to access and transit through the territory of coastal states to reach the sea. Article 125 affirms that such access should be exercised “by mutual agreement” and in a manner that respects the sovereignty of transit states while preventing arbitrary obstruction (United Nations, 1982). Although Eritrea is not a party to UNCLOS, the principles enshrined in Part X reflect broader customary norms that inform international expectations regarding transit rights and obligations (UNCTAD, 2023; UN-OHRLLS, 2022). Anchoring Ethiopia–Eritrea port arrangements in these norms could help depersonalize negotiations and reduce the scope for strategic misperception.
At the regional level, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides an emerging legal framework for transit facilitation, customs harmonization, and corridor development. The Protocol on Trade in Goods emphasizes the reduction of non-tariff barriers and the promotion of seamless cross-border trade objectives directly relevant to Ethiopia’s landlocked condition (AfCFTA Secretariat, 2021). Similarly, IGAD’s regional infrastructure and connectivity initiatives offer platforms through which Ethiopia and Eritrea could multilateralize port cooperation, thereby reducing bilateral asymmetry and embedding their relationship within a wider web of regional interdependence (IGAD, 2022).
The concept of cooperative sovereignty is particularly salient in this context. Rather than viewing sovereignty as absolute control over territory and infrastructure, cooperative sovereignty emphasizes shared management, joint oversight, and mutually agreed limitations on unilateral action in pursuit of collective gains (Keohane, 2002; African Union Commission, 2023). Applied to Ethiopia–Eritrea relations, this approach would entail the establishment of joint port and corridor authorities, standardized legal regimes for transit, and third-party monitoring or arbitration mechanisms to manage disputes. Such arrangements do not erode sovereignty; rather, they enhance it by increasing predictability, reducing conflict risk, and enabling both states to extract long-term benefits from cooperation (World Bank, 2024; UNCTAD, 2023).
Importantly, corridor-based cooperation also carries peacebuilding dividends beyond the economic sphere. Institutionalized transit regimes create constituencies traders, transport workers, local communities, and investors whose livelihoods depend on stability and open borders (International Crisis Group, 2024). Over time, these constituencies can generate bottom-up pressure against renewed militarization and contribute to the normalization of relations. In the Horn of Africa, where historical grievances and securitized narratives remain potent, embedding peace within legal and economic institutions offers a pathway to transform symbolic reconciliation into durable coexistence.
Conclusion
The Ethiopia–Eritrea relationship illustrates the dilemmas of landlocked geopolitics. Structural asymmetry, mistrust, and regional instability sustain fragility, yet they also offer opportunities for transformative cooperation. Applying the Security and Foreign Policy of Landlocked States framework reveals that peacebuilding in the Horn requires not only leadership diplomacy but also institutionalized interdependence. If Ethiopia and Eritrea operationalize corridor diplomacy and cooperative sovereignty, they can redefine their futures from adversarial neighbors to strategic partners, anchoring regional stability and prosperity.
References
African Continental Free Trade Area Secretariat. (2021). Protocol on trade in goods. AfCFTA Secretariat.
African Development Bank Group. (2023). Horn of Africa economic outlook: Unlocking regional corridors for resilience and growth. AfDB.
African Union Commission. (2023). Agenda 2063: Regional infrastructure development and integration framework. African Union.
Aweke, A. K., & Seid, M. (2022). The Ethiopia–Eritrea rapprochement: Highly personalised and less-institutionalised initiative. Third World Quarterly, 44(4), 762–775.
Bereketeab, B. (2019). The Ethiopia–Eritrea rapprochement: Peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. Nordic Africa Institute.
Butcher, C., & Maru, M. (2018). Diversionary tactics and the Ethiopia–Eritrea War (1998–2000). Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29(1), 68–90.
Chatham House. (2024). Red Sea security, great power competition, and African coastal states. Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Intergovernmental Authority on Development. (2022). Regional infrastructure and connectivity strategy. IGAD.
International Crisis Group. (2022). Eritrea, Tigray and the risks of renewed confrontation. ICG Africa Report.
International Crisis Group. (2024). The Red Sea crisis and its implications for the Horn of Africa. ICG.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2024). Red Sea security and maritime instability in the Horn of Africa. IISS.
Keohane, R. O. (2002). Power and governance in a partially globalized world. Routledge.
Mahdi, S. (2021). Security and foreign policy of landlocked states (Unpublished master’s thesis). Kabul University.
Plaut, M. (2023). Eritrea and the Tigray War: The unfinished business. African Arguments.
Reuters. (2023). Eritrea arming groups in Ethiopia’s Amhara region. Reuters.
Stigant, S., & Phelan, M. V. (2019). A year after the Ethiopia–Eritrea peace deal, what is the impact? United States Institute of Peace.
United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2023). Improving transport connectivity for landlocked developing countries. UNCTAD.
United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States. (2022). Landlocked developing countries and transit dependence. UN-OHRLLS.
Vertin, Z. (2019). Red Sea rivalries: The Gulf, the Horn, and the new geopolitics of the Red Sea. Brookings Institution.
World Bank. (2024). Ethiopia economic update: Navigating logistics constraints and regional uncertainty. World Bank.
World Trade Organization. (2017). Trade facilitation agreement. WTO.
